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TRADE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PRODUCTIVITY: 






Brazil's trade liberalization between 1990 and 1993, and its partial reversal in 1995, are used 
to study how reduced inward trade barriers affect productivity. The production function of 
Brazilian manufacturers is estimated at the ISIC3 two-digit level under various alternatives, 
including an extension of Olley and Pakes' (1996) procedure. Firm-level productivity is 
inferred and then related to trade. Findings suggest that (1) foreign competition pressures 
firms to raise productivity markedly, whereas (2) the use of foreign inputs plays a minor role 
for productivity change. (3) The shutdown probability of inefficient firms rises with 
competition from abroad, thus contributing positively to aggregate productivity. 
Counterfactual simulations indicate that the competitive push (1) is an important source of 
immediate productivity change, while the elimination of inefficient firms (3) unfolds its 
impact slowly. 
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 The repeal of trade barriers might exert a positive impact on productivity
change and country-wide growth. A body of empirical evidence at the macroe-
conomic level across countries (Ben-David 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995), at
the level of sectors (Keller 2000, Kim 2000), and at the level of ¯rms or plants
points towards a positive e®ect of trade on productivity change (Tybout, Melo
and Corbo 1991, Levinsohn 1993, Roberts and Tybout, eds 1996, Pavcnik
2002). However, (Rodr¶ ³guez and Rodrik 2000) and others contest the cross-
country evidence for measurement and unresolved endogeneity problems.
The micro-econometric evidence lacks an identi¯cation of the exact mech-
anisms by which trade may induce productivity change and provides little
guidance to policy makers who contemplate trade reform. Endogenous trade
policies potentially confound estimates. Moreover, several ¯rm-level and aggre-
gate processes may drive productivity change simultaneously. Tybout (2003)
concludes in a recent literature review that \it is di±cult to ¯nd studies that
convincingly link these processes to the trade regime."
Employing a newly constructed data set of Brazilian manufacturers for
the years 1986-1998|a period of major changes to inward trade barriers in
Brazil|, the present paper separates and analyzes three distinct mechanisms
(channels) behind trade-induced productivity change at the level of ¯rms.
These candidate channels are:
1. Competitive Push: The removal of inward trade barriers increases compe-
tition on the product market. This may induce ¯rms to improve existing
processes and owners to address agency problems.
2. Foreign Input Push: High-quality equipment and intermediate goods
allow ¯rms to adopt new production methods. This can raise e±ciency.
These two e®ects tend to shift a ¯rm's productivity. In addition, a separate
group of trade e®ects on productivity can only be observed at the level of
sectors or industries. The focus lies on
3. Competitive Elimination: Increased foreign competition makes the least
e±cient ¯rms shutdown. Their exit raises average productivity.
For the ¯rst time, the present paper can assess the relative importance of
these three channels vis µ a vis each other, and evaluates their overall importance
for productivity change in Brazilian manufacturing during the years 1986-98.
While trade-induced productivity changes at the ¯rm level are present and sig-
ni¯cant even after controlling for possibly confounding e®ects and endogenous
policies, the gains are moderate. After all, the largest gains from trade may
indeed be those to consumers, as classic trade theory posits, and not so much
those from productivity change.
2Concretely, this paper asks: How did Brazil's removal of inward trade barri-
ers a®ect productivity among its medium-sized to large manufacturers? Brazil's
federal governments began to reform the tari® act in 1988. From 1990 to 1993,
it slashed non-tari® barriers and tari®s to less than a quarter of their initial
e®ective levels (Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi 2003).
Microeconometric studies on the Competitive Push (1) and Competitive
Elimination (3) include Levinsohn (1993), Roberts and Tybout, eds (1996)
and Pavcnik (2002). For Brazil, Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi (2003, sector
data), Hay (2001, ¯rm data), and Schor (2003, ¯rm data) ¯nd a positive
impact of trade reform on manufacturing productivity. Special variables in
the present data set trace a ¯rm's economic destiny|its exporting status, and
its suspension or extinction. These groups of variables permit re¯nements in
the estimation technique.
A unique feature of the present ¯rm data is the information on foreign
equipment acquisitions at the ¯rm level. In addition, the use of foreign in-
termediate inputs is reported. So, the present data can identify the Foreign
Input Push (2). To my knowledge, Feenstra, Markusen and Zeile (1992) and
Fernandes (2003) are the only prior studies that can trace e®ects of intermedi-
ate inputs, though not of foreign equipment, on productivity at the micro-level
(Korean business groups and Colombian manufacturers, respectively). Their
studies suggest that productivity is positively related to the use of high-quality
(foreign) intermediate goods.
The empirical strategy of the present study involves three stages. First, I
obtain consistent ¯rm-level productivity estimates for an unbalanced panel of
9,500 manufacturing ¯rms and simultaneously control for all three channels of
market-induced changes in a variant of the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure.
Second, I re¯ne the estimation on a channel-by-channel basis and provide
comparisons to two commonly used alternative productivity measures. Third,
on the basis of those estimates, I simulate ¯rm-level productivity change in
the absence of single channels.
Evidence on the Competitive Push (1) suggests that ¯rms raise their e±-
ciency considerably in response to increased competitive pressure from abroad.
To draw this conclusion, the analysis controls for the endogeneity of trade
policy and the simultaneity of foreign market penetration, using the nomi-
nal exchange rate and sector-speci¯c foreign producer prices as instrumental
variables. Results for the Foreign Input Push (2) suggest that, in many sec-
tors, the e±ciency of foreign equipment and intermediate inputs is higher than
the e±ciency of domestic inputs. Foreign inputs enter the production func-
tions explicitly. However, their overall e±ciency contribution is minor. The
adoption of new technologies can reduce productivity initially. Firms need
3to put high-quality inputs to adequate use in order to achieve productivity
gains. Possibly, Brazilian ¯rms in several sectors do not succeed with neces-
sary rearrangements in the short term. Third, ¯rm turnover and the exit of
the least productive ¯rms contributes positively to productivity change in the
aggregate. In an e®ort to evaluate this Competitive Elimination (3) directly,
probabilities of Markov transitions between states of operation are estimated
as functions of the trade regime. The exit probability increases strongly with
foreign competition.
To understand the relative importance of the three channels, counterfac-
tuals are evaluated in simulations. The counterfactuals ask how much less
productivity change would have occurred through each channel had Brazil not
reduced inward tari®s. These simulations show that the Competitive Push
(1) is an important source of immediate productivity change, while the For-
eign Input Push (2) is negligible and Competitive Elimination (3) exercises a
detectable impact on productivity only gradually.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an
overview of Brazilian trade policy during the sample period. Section 2 de-
scribes the data. Section 3 obtains ¯rm-speci¯c productivity measures and
provides immediate evidence on the three channels in a variant of the Olley
and Pakes (1996) algorithm. Building on the resulting ¯rm-level productivity
estimates and two common alternatives, section 4 re¯nes the estimation. Sec-
tion 5 evaluates in counterfactual simulations how Brazil's trade policy a®ected
productivity change through the three channels. Section 6 concludes.
1 Brazil's Trade Policy
For decades, policies of import substitution and industry protection were part
of Brazil's broader development strategy. Until the early nineties, elevated
tari®s, exchange rate controls and interventions, and especially prohibitive
non-tari® barriers were intended to reduce competitive pressure from abroad.
From the mid seventies until the late eighties, for instance, potential importers
to Brazil underwent rigorous examinations whether their commodities were
similar to domestic products. If so, their imports were banned. As a result,
the Brazilian domestic market remained essentially closed for a broad range of
foreign equipment, including computers.
In 1988, the federal government initiated a process of trade reforms that
reduced both the level and the cross-industry dispersion of tari®s. However,
the e®ect of these reforms was limited as non-tari® barriers remained unaltered
and continued to be binding for many imports (Kume, Piani and Souza 2000).
Only the Collor de Melo administration in 1990 was able to break with earlier
4Calendar Year
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Source: Own calculations, tari®s weighted by imports (all manufacturing).
Figure 1: Tari®s and foreign market penetration
Brazilian policies. The government presented a detailed schedule for tari® re-
ductions to be completed by 1994 and announced the elimination of non-tari®
barriers. Tari®s on equipment not produced in Brazil, for instance, were im-
mediately reduced to zero and non-tari® barriers were eliminated. Tari®s for
information technology, however, remained at 40 percent in order to protect
Brazil's °edgling computer industry. The government's main objectives for
dismantling trade barriers were ¯rst to instill competition in ine±cient sec-
tors and second to discipline concentrated industries in their pricing power
so that hyper-in°ation could be fought more e®ectively. As a consequence,
and contrary to common political-economy outcomes, mostly sectors with low
e±ciency performance were targeted with low tari®s. The liberalization pro-
gramme was concluded in less than three years by July 1993. This speed
and the far reaching removal of non-tari® barriers shocked the domestic man-
ufacturing sector considerably. When president Cardoso took o±ce in 1995,
liberalization e®orts were reversed in select sectors leading to renewed tari®
dispersion.1
1In°ation was under control since August 1994, the Brazilian trade de¯cit had widened
and new negotiations for the Southern Cone Customs Union Mercosur a®orded an oppor-
tunity to partly reverse prior tari® reductions.
5Figure 1 depicts tari® levels and market penetration for an import-weighted
average of all manufacturing sectors. Brazil's elevated (depreciated) real ex-
change rate added to protection until 1994. To show this, a tari® series
weighted by the real exchange rate is included alongside (the real exchange
rate is set to unity in August 1994). Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi (2003)
argue that, on average, the e®ective rate of protection was about 86 percent
of the import price in 1987. According to their measure, e®ective protection
fell to 18 percent by 1997. Brazil took hardly any steps to remove outward
barriers to trade or to stimulate exports beyond existing policies (Veiga 1998).
As a welcome consequence, the impact of trade reform on the import side can
be largely isolated from other e®ects of trade. Foreign direct investment, a
further key aspect of an economy's openness, rose strongly in Brazil over the
same period and will be controlled for.
2 Data
An unbalanced panel of 9,500 medium-sized to large ¯rms in Brazil's manu-
facturing sectors is constructed from the Brazilian statistical bureau's (IBGE)
annual survey Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA). The sample is not strictly rep-
resentative for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Yet, to trace the e®ects
of trade liberalization on productivity, only a random sample is needed that
was selected independent of trade exposure. This is satis¯ed. The present
section highlights the most important features of the data. A description of
the sample and details on data construction are relegated to appendix A.2
Output and domestic inputs are de°ated with sector-speci¯c price indices
(constructed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices and input-output
matrices). Capital stock ¯gures and investments are de°ated with economy-
wide price indices (constructed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices
and economy-wide capital formation vectors). There is no producer price index
for Brazil. The overall capital stock is inferred under a perpetual inventory
method that controls for changes to accounting law in 1991. Foreign inputs are
de°ated with exchange-rate and tari® adjusted, sector-speci¯c import-weighted
foreign producer and wholesale price indices. This de°ation procedure for
foreign inputs ensures that production function coe±cients on foreign inputs
are not a®ected by any price-related correlation between them and ¯rm-level
productivity (which may depend on the exchange rate and tari®s).
2Muendler (2003) presents an in-depth report on the PIA data base and the construction
of ¯rm-level panels for the period 1986 through 2001. I use the years 1986 through 1998 of
the data set.
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Source: Own calculations (all manufacturing).
Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual for equipment acquisitions. E®ective equipment tari®s from
Kume et al. (2000) weighted by the national capital formation vector (IBGE).
Figure 2: Foreign equipment acquisitions
Special state variables in PIA summarize a ¯rm's state of operation and
guarantee that observations with missing economic information are not con-
founded with a shutdown or temporary suspension of production. This is
particularly important as it was common among Brazilian manufacturers be-
tween 1986 and 1998 to \mothball" for extended periods of time. Among the
9,500 ¯rms, more than 1,100 state in at least one year that they suspended
production.
Figure 2 plots the evolution of foreign equipment acquisitions between 1986
and 1995. Importers of foreign equipment before 1991 continue to invest in
foreign equipment at roughly the same rate after 1991. However, the share of
foreign equipment in total equipment acquisitions jumps up signi¯cantly. So,
mostly ¯rms that did not acquire foreign equipment before 1991 do so after
trade liberalization.
3 Firm-level Productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) measures the aspect of a ¯rm's production
that physical factors such as capital, intermediate inputs, or labor of varying
7skills cannot explain. Apart from mere random shocks, managerial e®orts,
reorganizations, process innovations, and investments in the knowledge of the
work force a®ect TFP. These TFP-relevant e®orts are unobservable here as
in most data but they are alleged forces behind the three channels of trade-
induced productivity change: the Competitive Push, the Foreign Input Push,
and Competitive Elimination. Most importantly, it is a maintained hypothesis
of the present and many earlier studies that the ¯rms' competitive environment
and trade barriers in particular in°uence TFP-relevant e®orts (Nickell 1996,
Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Pavcnik 2002).
For the ¯rst time, the present study is able to assess the three channels vis
µ a vis each other. The present section discusses production function estimation
and provides ¯rst evidence in a single framework. The following section 4
revisits and re¯nes the estimation, and evaluates the importance of trade-
induced changes for overall productivity in Brazilian manufacturing through
simulations.
For purposes of the present analysis, I infer each ¯rm's individual produc-
tivity through three alternative methods. All methods yield time-invariant
sector-speci¯c production coe±cients, which serve as weights to remove the
physical factor contributions from output and to arrive at TFP. While pro-
duction function coe±cients di®er between these alternative methods, resulting
productivity estimates exhibit largely the same covariation with other vari-
ables. The reason is that a ¯rm's use of physical factors matters strongly for
its TFP measure, whereas the level of the weights for those inputs matters
less.
The ¯rst measure is Griliches and Mairesse's (1990) approximation to log
TFP. The second productivity measure, logTFP-OLS, derives from plain
OLS estimates of production functions on the unbalanced panel. The third
measure, logTFP-EOP, results from an extended (e±ciency-choice adjusted)
Olley and Pakes estimation procedure. Both latter measures control for a
potential e±ciency di®erence between foreign and domestic inputs that would
otherwise be attributed to overall TFP.
3.1 Production and foreign input e±ciency
To measure the e®ect of foreign inputs on production directly, one can allow
foreign inputs to carry a di®erent e±ciency parameter in Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction. Suppose ¯rm i produces with the same technology in every year t but
with possibly di®erent total factor productivity. Foreign equipment exceeds
the e±ciency of Brazilian equipment by a factor (1+°K), foreign intermediate
goods surpass domestic intermediate goods' e±ciency by a factor (1 + °M).
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Lower-case letters denote the log of variables. Yi;t is output. Lbl
i;t and Lwh
i;t
denote the number of blue and white-collar workers on December 31. There




i;t , and structures Si;t.4 Mdom
i;t and M
for
i;t are domestic and foreign
intermediate inputs. The error term ²i;t in (1) is a white noise shock to the
production technology, its variance (but not its mean under EOP) is taken to
be constant across ¯rms in a sector, and its realization is unknown both to
a ¯rm and the researcher. !i;t is the management controlled part in a ¯rm's
logTFP, unobserved by the researcher. In addition, every ¯rm's log age is a
regressor.
The share of foreign equipment in total equipment ·f is available for 1986
through 1995. The share of foreign intermediate purchases in total interme-
diate inputs ¹f is reported from 1996 to 1998. Stacking the observations ac-
cordingly identi¯es ¯K°K and ¯M°M in the respective subperiods. Section 4.2
(Foreign Input Push) will discuss the ¯ndings on foreign input e±ciency in
depth, compare the Cobb-Douglas coe±cients to estimates under Box-Cox
transforms, and argue that even surprisingly high positive estimates for °K
and °M do not yield a strong e®ect of foreign inputs on overall e±ciency.
3.2 Firm-level total factor productivity
Equation (1) is estimated for 27 manufacturing sectors at n¶ ³vel 50 (similar to
the ISIC3 two-digit level) with ordinary least squares (OLS), ¯rm-¯xed e®exts
(FE), and an extended Olley-Pakes algorithm (EOP). OLS does not treat !i;t
separate from ²i;t. FE considers !i;t = ¯0;i to be a time-invariant ¯rm-¯xed
e®ect. Only EOP treats !i;t distinctly. All coe±cients are taken to be constant
3Among the ¯rms that dispose of foreign equipment, the average foreign equipment share
is about 14.7 percent in PIA. Among the ¯rms that use foreign intermediates, the average
share of foreign intermediates is 21.6 percent. Sample means are 2.9 and 9.3 percent, re-
spectively. So, the approximation should be quite precise.
4Si;t includes real estate, premises, but also other capital goods such vehicles, computers,
and rented or leased capital goods.
9between 1986 and 1998. This yields time-invariant sector-speci¯c weights for
the productivity measures.



















for ¾ = 1=3.
For OLS production function estimates, log total factor productivity at the
¯rm level is
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To focus on three measures only, FE productivity measures are not presented
in this study.
The third productivity measure logTFP-EOP results from an extended
(e±ciency-choice adjusted) Olley and Pakes estimation procedure, which is
derived and applied in Muendler (2004). For this purpose, the productivity







i;t;Dt) + ¯0;i + »i;t,
where !i;t = ln­i;t is the log e±ciency of ¯rm i at t and taken to be under the
management's control, ¯0;i is the ¯rm-speci¯c mean of productivity shocks, and
»i;t is a serially uncorrelated shock to productivity with mean zero and constant
variance across ¯rms in a sector. The function h(¢) of ¯rm-level investments
and market conditions approximates individual business prospects and ¯rm-
level e±ciency responses to the competitive environment. The ¯rm's capital
is decomposed into equipment ki;t and structures si;t, and so is physical net
investment (IK
i;t;IS
i;t). Both ¯0;i and »i;t are known to the ¯rm when it chooses
variable factor inputs and investment for next period. While entirely known
to the ¯rm's management, !i;t is unobservable to the researcher.
The ¯rst regression equation is
yi;t = ¯0;i + ¯bl l
bl
i;t + ¯wh l
wh
i;t + ¯M °M ¹
f









i;t;Dt) + »i;t + ²i;t, (4)
a ¯rm-¯xed e®ects regression. A polynomial series estimator of fourth-order
approximates Á(¢) ´ ¯K °K ·
f
i;t + ¯K ki;t + ¯S si;t + h(¢). While this ¯rst step
provides consistent estimates for ¯0;i, ¯bl, ¯wh, ¯M°M and ¯M, the capital
coe±cients ¯K, ¯K°K and ¯S are not identi¯ed yet.
10Variables Dt that characterize a ¯rm's competitive environment (foreign
market penetration, the economy-wide real exchange rate, nominal tari®s, ag-
gregate demand and the annual in°ation rate) partly approximate investments
in productivity-relevant assets. The interaction of these variables with the
¯rms' physical investment in equipment and structures is intended to capture
both general business prospects and the ¯rms' individual expectations about
them. To avoid a simultaneity problem from the fact that market conditions
Dt respond to prevailing productivity, the nominal exchange rate and foreign
producer price indices at the sector level are used as instrumental variables to
predict foreign market penetration and nominal tari®s. To ¯rms, moves in the
nominal exchange rate and innovations in foreign producer costs are largely
unforeseeable at the time of their investment in productivity-relevant assets.
Section 4.1 will discuss the validity and predictive power of these instruments
in detail.
Next, the probability of a ¯rm's survival





is estimated with independent logit functions for the pre-1991 and the post-
1991 data, taking into account that the shutdown probabilities may have
changed systematically after trade liberalization. I estimate probabilities over
a fourth-order polynomial in (IK
i;t;IS
i;t;ai;t;ki;t;si;t) and Dt.
Table 1 summarizes logit and probit estimates of survival probabilities for
the sample as a whole. When distinguishing by sector, the logit model (cor-
relation coe±cient .256) slightly outperforms probit (.249) and is kept subse-
quently. An elevated (depreciated) real exchange rate results in more protec-
tion and thus a higher survival likelihood. Coe±cients on market penetration
and tari®s are not signi¯cant in the baseline regressions (columns 1, 2, 4,
and 5). When added, an indicator for exporting status commands a highly
signi¯cant, positive coe±cient (columns 3 and 6). Exporters are more likely to
survive. The inclusion of exporting status also makes the coe±cient on tari®s
signi¯cant. However, that sign becomes implausibly negative and points to
an omitted variable: Firm-level productivity. Productivity is negatively cor-
related with tari®s but positively related to survival and exporting status. At
this stage, productivity remains to be estimated and the current survival ap-
proximation serves as an intermediate step to that end. Consequently, exiting
behavior and other aspects of turnover will be revisited in section 4.3 once
productivity estimates are available.
A third-order polynomial expansion approximates the expectation of a sur-
11Table 1: Survival Probabilities
Logit Probit
86-90 92-98 89-98a 86-90 92-98 89-98a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real exch. rate (usd)b 5.255 1.13 2.301 2.322 .565 1.005
(.39) (.507) (.369) (.169) (.223) (.161)
Foreign mkt. penetration .307 -.4 -.474 .138 -.172 -.198
(1.136) (.615) (.551) (.499) (.271) (.246)
Nominal tari® .529 -.446 -.667 .233 -.24 -.342
(.308) (.738) (.263) (.132) (.327) (.124)
CPI in°ation rate -.031 .082 -.016 -.014 .039 -.008
(.005) (.017) (.007) (.002) (.007) (.003)
¶(Exporter) .558 .246
(.083) (.036)
Observations 25,783 23,627 28,932 25,783 23,627 28,932
Outcome correlationc .256 .249
aExporting status observed since 1989.
bAnnual. Based on IPA-OG and US producer price index.
cCorrelation between predictions (zero to one) and outcomes (either zero or one).
Further regressors: Log age, log capital stock, net investment, constant and second to
fourth-order polynomial terms (not reported).
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where !(ki;t;si;t;Dt) is the minimal productivity realization that a ¯rm with
capital ki;t and si;t tolerates to stay in business under market conditions Dt.
The ^ P term in the polynomial expansion is the logit-predicted survival like-
lihood. The unknown productivity component ^ h results from ^ h(¢) = ^ Á(¢) ¡
^ (¯K°K)·
f
i;t+1 + ^ ¯K ki;t+1 + ^ ¯S si;t+1. These considerations give rise to the third
estimation equation
zi;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯0;i ¡ ^ ¯bl l
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i;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯¹ ¹
f
i;t+1 ¡ ^ ¯M mi;t+1 (6)
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Non-linear least squares are applied, using estimates from ¯rm-¯xed e®ects
regressions as starting values. This last step yields consistent estimates for
¯K, ¯K°K and ¯S.
12Table 2: Production Function Estimates (EOP)
Wood & Plant Food &
Output regressions
Machinery furniture Textiles products beverages
(08) (14) (22) (26) (31)
Log blue-coll. empl. .396 .426 .396 .347 .386
(.025) (.026) (.025) (.021) (.029)
Log white-coll. empl. .230 .156 .150 .219 .195
(.018) (.014) (.018) (.017) (.016)
Foreign eqpm. share .073 -.299 .138 -.243 -.044
(.099) (.071) (.043) (.101) (.086)
Log equipment .013 .175 .030 .081 .066
(.016) (.019) (.016) (.018) (.014)
Log structures .077 .060 .079 .058 .039
(.017) (.016) (.016) (.023) (.013)
Foreign intm. share .114 .262 -.532 -.223 -.129
(.575) (.239) (.277) (.21) (.268)
Log intermediates .228 .229 .322 .244 .211
(.015) (.013) (.019) (.013) (.012)
Foreign market pen. -391.252 -529.533 1008.876 85.044 -1945.13
(713.367) (306.53) (419.31) (305.721) (547.761)
Nominal tari® -19.154 -50.555 97.281 14.023 -193.01
(74.215) (30.249) (41.34) (30.431) (54.776)
Log aggr. demand 307.473 137.578 289.411 65.781 -115.13
(95.159) (47.621) (66.741) (69.821) (80.881)
Observations 2,695 2,835 3,260 2,764 3,432
Data: Pesquisa Industrial Annual 1986-1998. Standard errors from 200 bootstraps.
Not reported: Log age, net investment, real exchange rate, in°ation rate, higher-order poly-
nomial terms.
Table 2 lists EOP production function estimates for the ¯ve sectors with
most ¯rm-year observations. The e±ciency e®ect of foreign inputs is mostly not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. When signi¯cant, foreign equipment exhibits
a negative e±ciency e®ect in two out of the three sectors in table 2. This
suggests that the mean ¯rm may not succeed in putting more expensive foreign
equipment to su±ciently e®ective use during the sampling period.
Only time but no cross-sectional variation identi¯es the coe±cients on for-
eign market penetration and tari®s in the output regressions within each sector.
This results in erratic estimates. As was the case with turnover estimation, the
e®ect of competition variables on productivity should be revisited. Section 4.1
will provide a cross-sectional time-series analysis once consistent estimates of
13Calendar Year
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Data: Firm-level productivity in 27 manufacturing sectors in PIA from EOP estimates, compared
to Log TFP estimates for Brazil by Bugarin, Ellery Jr., Gomes and Teixeira (2002).
Figure 3: Log TFP and labor productivity in manufacturing
productivity change are at hand. Section 4.2 discusses the coe±cient estimates
on foreign equipment and foreign intermediate inputs.
For EOP production estimates, ¯rm-level log TFP is
lnTFP-EOPi;t = yi;t ¡ ¹ ¯J ¡
³
^ ¯K ki;t + ^ ¯S si;t + ^ ¯M mi;t + ^ ¯bl lbl





The average ¯rm-¯xed e®ect ¹ ¯J ´
PJ
j2S ¯0;j=J eliminates confounding time-
invariant demand conditions from lnTFP-EOPi;t.
Price is under a ¯rm's control in imperfectly competitive markets. To
address this issue, Klette and Griliches (1996) argue that, under monopolistic
competition and for a constant elasticity of substitution, aggregate demand can
serve as a control variable in the regression. However, the e®ect of aggregate
demand on endogenous e±ciency choice cannot be separated from its e®ect
on price setting (Muendler 2004). I therefore remove only the time-invariant
demand conditions in sector S from lnTFP-EOPi;t by subtracting the average
¯rm-¯xed e®ect ¹ ¯J at this stage. Subsequent regressions control for aggregate
demand.
Foreign inputs are only known for certain subperiods. So, input e±ciency
estimates cannot be subtracted from any of the three productivity measures.
Subsequent regressions will therefore also include foreign inputs as regressors.
Figure 3 illustrates how TFP evolves in the aggregate of all 27 manufac-
14turing sectors between 1986 and 1998. Except for a larger drop during the
recession in the late eighties and the subsequent recovery, changes are small
in general. At its trough, log TFP drops to .981 in 1990, but recovers and
reaches 1.028 by 1998, roughly a ¯ve-percent increase over 8 years. Bugarin
et al. (2002) report similar, though more volatile aggregate TFP ¯gures for
Brazilian industry. Cavalcanti Ferreira and Rossi (2003) ¯nd no productivity
drop during the 1988-90 recession and a more pronounced labor productivity
increase during the 1990s. The present study is the only one to employ an
extensive ¯rm-level sample. Most previous studies on Brazilian industry con-
sider labor productivity. As ¯gure 3 shows, labor productivity increases more
strongly than TFP during the 1990s (from .986 to 1.053) because ¯rms raise
their capital stock.
The extended Olley and Pakes (EOP) estimation procedure provides a co-
herent framework to obtain productivity estimates and o®ers ¯rst evidence on
the workings of the three channels (Competitive Push, Foreign Input Push,
Competitive Elimination). Dismantled trade barriers accelerate Competitive
Elimination and survival probabilities drop. The contribution of this e®ect to
overall productivity remains to be evaluated. The e±ciency e®ect of foreign
inputs is mostly insigni¯cant, at times negative, and suggests only a small con-
tribution of the Foreign Input Push to overall productivity. The Competitive
Push through imports in product markets proved di±cult to evaluate on a
sector-speci¯c basis since only time variation could provide identi¯cation. To
draw more de¯nitive conclusions, the following section revisits the three chan-
nels individually and mutually exclusively now that consistent productivity
estimates are available.
4 Trade-induced Productivity Change
How does trade liberalization a®ect productivity? Do ¯rms advance to best
practice? If so, do foreign inputs contribute to the convergence? Do managers
push their ¯rms' e±ciency? Or does productivity improve primarily because
the least competitive ¯rms are shaken out? Questions like these are related
to three channels of trade e®ects on productivity: (1) A Competitive Push,
(2) a Foreign Input Push, and (3) Competitive Elimination. An adequate way
to evaluate the e®ects of trade on productivity seems to be a counterfactual
approach. How would productivity have evolved in the absence of any of the
three channels?
Subsection 4.1 investigates whether reduced trade barriers exert a positive
e®ect on e±ciency because of ¯ercer competition in the product market (Com-
petitive Push). Subsection 4.2 (Foreign Input Push) revisits the direct e®ect
15of foreign inputs on productivity. Subsection 4.3 analyzes to what degree inef-
¯cient ¯rms are shaken out (Competitive Elimination) and sheds light on the
question whether more e±cient ¯rms become exporters. Subsection 4.4 dis-
cusses brie°y the e®ects of potential further channels. The following section 5
will compare the three primary channels, posing the counterfactual that no
trade liberalization was undertaken. The Competitive Push (1) stands out as
the most important channel.
4.1 Channel 1: Competitive Push
Theoretical work posits that increased foreign competition can foster prod-
uct and process innovation (Boone 2000) or the adoption of new technologies
(Yeaple 2003). Foreign competition may also end the `quiet life' of man-
agers and allow ¯rms to enforce higher e±ciency (Hermalin 1992, Schmidt
1997). The counterfactual question is: What would ¯rm-level productivity
have looked like had there not been an increase in competitive pressure due to
foreign imports, or the threat of more foreign imports?
To ¯nd an answer, I regress the change in ¯rm-level productivity on two
variables related to foreign competition: the nominal tari® in the ¯rms' re-
spective output markets and the penetration of their markets with foreign
imports. Market penetration proxies the level of non-tari® barriers in Brazil,
while nominal tari® levels capture the e®ect of tari® barriers directly. For-
eign penetration is measured as the share of imports per absorption in a given
market. To separate this channel from the Foreign Input Push and Compet-
itive Elimination, I include foreign input variables as regressors and consider
productivity change, rather than levels, among year-over-year survivors.
However, there are econometric concerns. Market penetration and low tari®
barriers may not only induce ¯rms to strive for higher productivity. Causa-
tion can also run in the opposite direction. Consider tari®s. The Brazilian
government justi¯ed its repeal of trade barriers with the intention to instill
e±ciency change through foreign competitive pressure and to create checks on
the pricing power of concentrated industries. If the government pursued these
objectives, it must have applied lower tari®s to sectors with slow e±ciency
change. This introduces a positive correlation between TFP change and tari®
levels.5 Second, take market penetration. When barriers to imports fall, the
least e±cient sectors are likely to attract the strongest in°ux of competing im-
ports. In other words, low productivity performance may cause high market
5Common political-economy arguments would suggest the converse that less e±cient
sectors with the largest losses at stake lobby successfully for higher protection. Either way,
an endogeneity problem calls for resolution.
16penetration, which brings about a negative correlation between TFP change
and market penetration.
Instrumental variables (IVs) can remedy both sources of endogeneity and
simultaneity. Foreign market penetration not only depends on tari®s and com-
petitors' productivity but also responds to a country's terms of trade. The real
exchange rate °uctuates considerably over the period 1986 to 1998 and is thus
an important factor for the relative price of imports. Certain components of
the real exchange rate are exogenous variables in the sense that they a®ect
foreign ¯rms' entry decision (and the government's tari® choice) but Brazilian
¯rms are unable to anticipate them at the time of their productivity invest-
ment.
The real exchange rate is decomposed here into several components, each
serving as an instrument. Baseline IVs are the nominal exchange rate rel-
ative to the US dollar, an average sector-speci¯c European and an average
sector-speci¯c US-Canadian producer price index (using Brazilian imports as
weights).6 Revenga (1992) employs similar IVs in the context of foreign trade
and labor markets.
Nominal exchange rates are hard to predict in economic models, and Brazil-
ian ¯rms are likely not able to forecast the US dollar exchange rate well. This
makes the nominal exchange rate a valid instrument. Foreign producer prices
proxy current production costs among foreign competitors. For Brazilian man-
agers, the multitude of factors that a®ect producer costs abroad are di±cult
to anticipate. These factors range from changes to individual competitors' e±-
ciency, to wage levels and rental rates, to macroeconomic shocks. So, Brazilian
¯rms' TFP-relevant decisions are likely taken before shocks to foreign pro-
ducer costs occur, which makes contemporaneous foreign producer prices valid
instruments.
There are two endogenous variables, tari®s and market penetration. Three
baseline IVs predict them: the nominal exchange rate, the European and the
US-Canadian price index. Joint F tests on the IVs in the ¯rst-stage regressions
refute the hypothesis that these are weak instruments (with F test statistics
orders of magnitude above 10, Staiger and Stock 1997).
Table 3 shows how survivors change e±ciency in response to their com-
petitive environment. Only regressions of the changes (¯rst di®erences) in log
TFP can separate the Competitive Push on survivors from Competitive Elim-
ination through sample exit. A di®erence-in-di®erence analysis con¯rms that
6More than a quarter of Brazilian imports between 1986 and 1998 are US products.
Trade weights are based on the year 1995. PPI series come from BLS for the US and from
SourceOECD's Indicators of Industry and Services for all other OECD member countries.
For the non-OECD countries among Brazil's major 25 trading partners WPI and CPI indices
from www.global¯ndata.com are used.
17exiting ¯rms have lower productivity on average. Fiercer foreign competition
is likely to bring about more exits. So, level regressions would confuse the
two channels and inappropriately boost the estimates. Unobserved manage-
rial ability, product quality and output composition, and any sector-speci¯c
constants such as potentially di®ering units of measurement, are likely to a®ect
a ¯rm's TFP. Consequently, a ¯xed-e®ects model is estimated throughout and
standard errors are corrected accordingly.
Table 3 summarizes the regression results for the logTFP-EOP measure
as dependent variable. Column 1 reports the ¯xed-e®ects (FE) estimation in
the absence of instrumentation. The two-stage least-squares FE (2SLS-FE)
approach is synthesized in columns 2 through 4. For comparisons, column 5
presents a plain FE regression with the logTFP-GM measure (absent instru-
mentation). The dependent variable in all regressions is the ¯rst di®erence
in log TFP (except, of course, for the ¯rst-stage IV regressions in columns 3
and 4). In general, a substantial random component appears to drive changes
to log TFP. Low R2 values indicate that both ¯rm-level and market-level
regressors predict only a small share of the changes in log TFP.
Both the nominal ad valorem tari®s on ¯nal goods and the market penetra-
tion rates with foreign goods are fractions, measured on a scale from zero to one
(or beyond in the case of tari®s). Lower tari®s induce ¯rms to raise e±ciency,
as does higher market penetration (column 1). The e®ects are signi¯cant even
when endogeneity and simultaneity issues are not addressed. However, as ar-
gued above, there is likely a positive bias in the tari® coe±cient (bad e±ciency
performers are targeted with low tari®s) and a negative bias in the coe±cient
on market penetration (ine±cient sectors are easy game for foreign competi-
tors). In fact, 2SLS-FE estimates raise the estimates in absolute value (pushing
the tari® coe±cient further into the negative and the penetration coe±cient
up, column 2). This con¯rms the suspected endogeneity. The same suspected
positive bias in tari®s and negative bias in market penetration can be detected
in level regressions. Estimates would be more favorable when inferring produc-
tivity from a simple logTFP-GM calculation (not instrumenting in the present
¢ logTFP-GM regression, column 5).
Considering the 2SLS-FE estimates, a reduction of nominal tari®s by 10
percentage points (.1) induces ¯rms to increase log TFP by .061. An increase
in foreign market penetration by 1 percentage point (.01) raises log TFP by
another .035. Log TFP is about 8.08 on average across all sectors and years.
So, a reduction of nominal tari®s by 10 percentage points pushes log TFP
(EOP) by three quarters of a percent ([:061=8:08] ¤ 100). At the ¯ve-year
horizon, 2SLS-FE regressions cease to yield signi¯cant coe±cients. In plain FE
regressions, however, changes in tari®s have almost identical e±ciency e®ects.
18Table 3: Foreign Competition and Productivity Change
FE (EOP) 2SLS-FE (EOP) FE (GM)
¢lnTFP ¢lnTFP Tari® M.Pen. ¢lnTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nominal tari® -.132 -.611 -.270
(.027) (.072) (.051)
Market penetration 1.090 3.494 1.565
(.149) (.558) (.289)
·f -.056 -.109 -.085 .001 -.281
(.029) (.03) (.006) (.001) (.057)
¹f .090 .081 .069 .028 .418
(.035) (.04) (.008) (.001) (.068)
¶(medium Ltot)a .160 .162 -.002 -.003 .198
(.029) (.03) (.006) (.001) (.057)
¶(big Ltot)a .185 .186 -.013 -.005 .172
(.031) (.031) (.006) (.001) (.059)
¶(medium cap.)b -.091 -.077 .006 .0002 .021
(.022) (.022) (.005) (.0009) (.043)
¶(big cap.)b -.101 -.077 .003 -.001 .062
(.024) (.025) (.005) (.001) (.047)
Sector demandc -.269 -.347 -.054 .018 -.467
(.013) (.018) (.003) (.0005) (.025)
FDI °owd -.039 -.062 -.047 -.0003 -.116
(.008) (.009) (.002) (.0003) (.016)
Cum. FDId .020 .059 .037 -.006 .049
(.007) (.009) (.001) (.0003) (.014)
Nom. exch. rate (usd) .583 .075
(.015) (.003)
CPI Brazil -.376 -.057
(.014) (.003)
PPI EU -.218 .072
(.019) (.004)
PPI North America .035 -.156
(.019) (.004)
Obs. 30,841 30,841 30,841 30,841 30,841
R2 (within) .021 .002 .860 .595 .032
F (instruments) 1730.7 817.9
aMedium: (30 · Ltot
i;t < 300), big: (Ltot
i;t ¸ 300).
bMedium: Ki;t + Si;t in middle tercile of all ¯rms in a year, big: in upper tercile.
cSector-wide sales in PIA, augmented by foreign market penetration.
dBillion USD per sector. Cumulated FDI is end-of-year stock of invested foreign capital.
Further regressors: Age, Age2 (not reported).
19Regressions of 5-year changes on 5-year changes show that a 10-percentage-
point drop in tari®s (.1) is associated with an increase of .065 in log TFP
(table 4, column 4). Given that total TFP change in Brazilian manufacturing
was only about ¯ve percent throughout the nineties, .75 percent are noticeable.
A careful counterfactual simulation will follow in section 5 and con¯rm that
the Competitive Push has a detectable impact on overall TFP in Brazilian
manufacturing.
To isolate the e®ect of foreign competition from possibly confounding ef-
fects, ¯rm-level variables such as foreign inputs and indicators for relative ¯rm
size are in the Competitive Push regressions. Schor (2003) analyzes a similar
sample of Brazilian manufacturers, controls for channels 1 and 2 by using ¯nal-
good and input tari®s separately in log TFP regressions, and ¯nds a slightly
stronger coe±cient on input tari®s than on ¯nal-good tari®s. To keep the two
channels separate here, foreign inputs are included as covariates. Estimates
suggest that ¯rms that start to use more foreign inputs su®er a slowdown in
productivity in the subsequent year (table 3). They face implementation costs,
may need to retrain workers and carry out adjustments to the production pro-
cess (compare subsection 4.2).
The stock of sector-wide invested foreign capital correlates positively with
productivity increases at the ¯rm-level. Foreign investment (FDI) directed to
a sector as a whole may force each individual ¯rm to improve e±ciency because
foreign-owned domestic competitors are likely to become more productive with
foreign capital. So, FDI may work like a substitute for trade liberalization.
However, it takes USD 1 Billion to raise log TFP by .062|an increase that
a tari® reduction by 10 percentage points (.1) can also achieve. The invested
foreign capital stock in Brazilian manufacturing totalled USD 30 Billion in
1998. In this light, an FDI in°ow of USD 1 Billion in a single sector would
be substantial. In addition, FDI °ows seem to have an o®setting negative
e®ect on productivity. This may be because FDI to foreign-owned domestic
competitors also reduces the market penetration of foreign ¯rms that export
to Brazil (column 4). Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997) ¯nd evidence of
positive e±ciency spillovers from multinational companies' FDI to domestic
manufacturers in Mexico. However, Aitken and Harrison (1999) cast doubt
on the generality of this ¯nding, showing that foreign investment negatively
a®ects the productivity of domestically owned plants in Venezuela. The mixed
coe±cients on cumulated FDI and FDI °ows in Brazil may point either way.
In the ¯rst stage of the instrumental variable estimation (columns 3 and 4),
¯xed-e®ects regressions are run using all observations. This makes the regres-
sions in columns 3 and 4 weighted ones. The tari® cannot be used as a predictor
of market penetration (column 4). If included, order conditions would fail and
20Table 4: Further Results on Foreign Competition and log TFP
Change
¢1yr lnTFP ¢5yrs lnTFP
EOP OLS GM EOP OLS GM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2SLS-FE
Tari®a (Level, ¢5yrs) -.611 -.525 -1.552 -4.585 -3.136 -2.550
(.072) (.079) (.141) (3.132) (2.922) (5.842)
Mkt. Pen.b (Level, ¢5yrs) 3.494 3.991 5.742 6.449 4.494 1.913
(.558) (.608) (1.087) (5.839) (5.446) (10.891)
FE
Tari® (Level, ¢5yrs) -.132 -.110 -.270 -.648 -.439 -.629
(.027) (.029) (.051) (.259) (.261) (.567)
Mkt. Pen. (Level, ¢5yrs) 1.090 1.132 1.565 -.656 -.765 -2.232
(.149) (.163) (.289) (.365) (.367) (.798)
Obs. 30,841 30,841 30,841 3,856 3,856 3,856
aThe F statistics on instruments for tari®s are 1730.7 and 56.1, respectively.
bThe F statistics on instruments for market penetration are 817.9 and 30.3, respectively.
Further regressors: Age, Age2, ·f, ¹f, ¶(medium Ltot), ¶(big Ltot), ¶(medium cap.), ¶(big
cap.), sector demand, FDI °ow, and Cumulated FDI (not reported).
the system would not be identi¯ed. Separate regressions show that market
penetration drops .74 percentage points on average across all sectors when
tari®s are raised by 10 percentage points.
Findings hardly change for the logTFP-OLS measure (from straight-for-
ward production function regressions on the unbalanced panel). Table 4 re-
ports coe±cients on tari®s and market penetration for a log TFP-OLS pro-
ductivity measure and contrasts them with estimates for the log TFP-EOP
measure (columns 2, 1 and 5, 4). In fact, t tests consistently fail to reject
the hypothesis that coe±cients for logTFP-EOP and logTFP-OLS measures
are identical. The rough logTFP-GM measure yields some signi¯cantly higher
coe±cient estimates in absolute value. However, the magnitude of competitive
e®ects on productivity is very similar across all three TFP measures.
The consistency of 2SLS estimates depends on the validity of the proposed
IVs. Table 5 documents a procedure to test for the validity of additional
instruments. Departing from a regression that includes only the baseline in-
struments (the nominal US dollar exchange rate, the EU producer prices and
the US-Canadian producer prices), I insert additional instruments and per-
form Hausman (1978) tests for overidenti¯cation. Brazilian domestic in°ation
21Table 5: Foreign Competition and Productivity Change, Over-
Identification tests for Validity of Instruments
2SLS-FE (EOP) Basea Add Add Add Add
CPI Brazil WPI World PPI OECD CPI Arg:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nominal tari® -.594 -.611 -.512 -.612 -.240
(.073) (.072) (.065) (.071) (.062)
Market penetration 3.762 3.494 3.558 4.033 2.776
(.577) (.558) (.569) (.522) (.563)
Obs. 30,841 30,841 30,841 30,841 30,841
^ Â2 3.677 16.799 .878 -91.704
Pr(Â2
12 > ^ Â2) .989 .157 1
aBaseline instrumental variables: Nom. exch. rate (usd), PPI EU, PPI North America
Further regressors: Age, Age2, ·f, ¹f, ¶(medium Ltot), ¶(big Ltot), ¶(medium cap.), ¶(big
cap.), sector demand, FDI °ow, and Cumulated FDI (not reported).
is more predictable for ¯rms and could possibly have an impact on managers'
e±ciency choice. It is therefore not taken as a baseline IV, notwithstanding its
importance for the real exchange rate. However, overidenti¯cation tests fail to
reject its validity by a large p value (column 2). One might suspect that Brazil-
ian manufacturers were able to anticipate well the aggregate price level of ma-
jor trading partners such as Argentina's (Brazil's number two source country
after the US). In fact, overidenti¯cation tests show that Argentina's CPI level
is not a well-behaved instrument (the Â2 test statistic takes a non-permissible
negative value, column 5). Neither a mixed index of annual and sector-speci¯c
wholesale, producer and consumer price indices for Brazil's major 25 import-
source countries (column 3) nor the sector-speci¯c producer price index of all
OECD countries among Brazil's major 25 import sources (column 4) change
point estimates signi¯cantly. This vindicates the likely validity of the baseline
instruments.
Had there not been an increase in competitive pressure due to foreign
imports, Brazilian manufacturers would have continued their `quiet lives' and
productivity would have improved more slowly.
4.2 Channel 2: Foreign Input Push
How would ¯rm productivity have evolved if ¯rms had not been able to in-
stall foreign equipment or to use foreign intermediates to the same extent?
22Table 6: Foreign Input Efficiency
Sector counts OLS EOPa FE
(1) (2) (3)
t tests for non-zero coe±cients
¯K°K 6= 0 13 (11) of 27 8 (3) of 27 3 (1) of 27
¯M°M 6= 0 11 (7) of 27 1 (1) of 27 8 (4) of 27
F tests for e±ciency di®erences
¯K°K 6= ¯K 11 (9) of 27 8 (2) of 27 4 (1) of 27
¯M°M 6= ¯M 11 (3) of 27 3 (1) of 27 11 (2) of 27
Averageb °K and °M
Mean \ ¯K°K=c ¯K 5.71 (13 of 27) -4.73 (3 of 27) -8.36 (1 of 27)
Mean \ ¯M°M= c ¯M .875 (11 of 27) 8.30 (1 of 27) .051 (8 of 27)
aVariance and covariance estimates from 200 bootstraps. Wald tests instead of F tests.
bSectors included if ¯K°K and ¯K, or ¯M°M and ¯M, signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at
.95 level.
Data: PIA 1986-98, de°ated with IPA-OG and import-weighted foreign PPI series.
Figures in (brackets) are counts of positive estimates \ ¯K°K > 0 or \ ¯M°M > 0. To
¯nd upper bounds on sector counts, signi¯cance levels are kept at .95 and not adjusted for
repeated testing.
Supposedly, foreign inputs exhibit higher quality and e±ciency.
Under a logarithmic approximation, the terms ¯K°K ·
f
i;t and ¯M°M ¹
f
i;t
measure the di®erential e®ect of foreign inputs on output. When included in
Cobb-Douglas production functions, these terms capture the e±ciency di®er-
ences between foreign and domestic inputs that would otherwise be attributed
to overall TFP. ¯K and ¯M are the elasticities of output with respect to total
equipment and total intermediate goods. (1 + °K) and (1 + °M) are the e±-
ciency premia of foreign inputs, and ·f and ¹f are the shares of foreign inputs
in the respective totals. ·f is available for the years 1986 through 1995, while
¹f is observed from 1996 until 1998. An accordingly stacked system identi¯es
the coe±cients (see section 3.1).
Table 6 summarizes in how many of the 27 sectors the coe±cients on foreign
equipment shares ·f and foreign intermediate goods shares ¹f signi¯cantly
di®er from zero (t tests) and from the coe±cients on total equipment k and
total intermediate inputs m (F tests). The coe±cients on ·f and ¹f are
estimates for ¯K°K and ¯M°M.
23The F tests (Wald tests in the case of EOP) check the null hypotheses
that ¯K°K = ¯K and ¯M°M = °M. Whereas OLS estimation of the pro-
duction function (column 2) tends to suggest frequent e±ciency di®erences
between foreign and domestic inputs, EOP estimation does not (column 3).
The reason is that OLS estimation fails to remove both ¯rm-¯xed e®ects and
endogenous policy responses from ¯rm-level productivity. In fact, omitting
the instrumental-variable prediction of competition variables from productiv-
ity estimation (section 3.2) would result in very di®erent estimates for foreign
inputs. Column 4 shows that ¯xed-e®ects estimation of the production func-
tion (!i;t = ¯0;i) also identi¯es fewer e±ciency di®erences between foreign and
domestic inputs than OLS. A common ¯nding is, however, that foreign inputs
are not always employed more e±ciently than domestic inputs. The coe±cients
on ·f and ¹f turn negative in several sectors with signi¯cant estimates.
E±ciency estimates of foreign equipment (¯K°K=¯K) and foreign interme-
diate inputs (¯M°M=¯M) are high in absolute value at the extremes and not
stable across estimation procedures. Under EOP estimation, signi¯cant °K
estimates vary between ¡9:4 and ¡1:8 (mean ¡4:7), the only signi¯cant °M
estimate is 8:3. This means that, in this one sector with a given factor elastic-
ity of intermediate goods, foreign intermediates are more than nine times more
e®ective in producing output than domestic inputs. Under OLS estimation,
the distribution is more volatile and °K varies between ¡11:5 and 13:9 (mean
5:7), °M takes values between ¡1:2 and 4:2 (mean :9). Negative coe±cients
may be interpreted as evidence that the average ¯rm in a given sector fails to
adjust its surrounding production process accordingly and cannot immediately
realize the potential bene¯ts of high-quality equipment or intermediate inputs.
Table 7 summarizes mean log TFP and the e®ect of foreign inputs in the
two sectors with the highest positive signi¯cant ¯K°K estimates (10, 24) and
the sector with the highest positive signi¯cant ¯M°M estimate (28). The ¯g-
ures show that foreign input e±ciency contributes only little to productivity.
Take foreign equipment in the electrical-equipment sector (10) as an exam-
ple. Between 1986 and 1990, these manufacturers invested strongly in foreign
equipment and pushed ¯K°K·f from .004 to .014. Without that .010 push, log
TFP would have fallen to 8.72 by 1990 but foreign equipment stopped the fall
at 8.73. This is less than a .2 percent contribution to overall log TFP for one of
the strongest positive ¯K°K e®ects in the sample. Similar calculations can be
made for other sectors and periods. Di®erential foreign input e±ciency neither
seems to serve as a break in times of falling productivity nor as a push in times
of rising log TFP. Counterfactual simulations in section 5 con¯rm that foreign
inputs do not exert noticeable bene¯ts beyond their price of acquisition.
Foreign machines of high quality tend to sell at a price premium over do-
24Table 7: Efficiency Contribution of Foreign Inputs
10 Electrical eqpm. 24 Footw. & leather 28 Dairy products
EOP logTFP Input logTFP Input logTFP Input
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
¯K°K¢·f ¯K°K¢·f ¯K°K¢·f
1986 8.857 .004 9.314 .002 11.263 -.005
1990 8.730 .014 8.985 .010 10.811 -.026
1992 9.203 .020 9.198 .018 10.914 -.028
1995 9.327 .044 9.029 .042 10.825 -.047
¯M°M¢¹f ¯M°M¢¹f ¯M°M¢¹f
1996 9.693 .025 8.949 .133 10.867 .071
1998 9.614 .032 9.046 .111 11.032 .196
Foreign inputs in the two sectors with the highest positive signi¯cant ¯K°K estimates
(10, 24) and the sector with the highest positive signi¯cant ¯M°M estimate (28).
Data: PIA 1986-98, de°ated with IPA-OG and import-weighted foreign PPI series.
mestic counterparts, and ¯rms need to put foreign machines to more e±cient
uses than domestic ones in order to avoid a productivity loss. Five sectors ex-
hibit signi¯cantly negative estimates of ¯K°K under EOP. These estimates may
be evidence that the mean ¯rm in those sectors fails to e®ectively implement
foreign inputs in the short term. Technology adaption takes time because of
factor complementarities, learning e®ects and necessary production rearrange-
ments. Similar arguments have been advanced to explain the productivity
slowdown in industrialized countries in periods of technology adoption.
Firms may learn over time how to integrate new foreign equipment into
their production. To test for this type of learning, one can split ·f into recent-
year investment and the lagged ·f level, and re-estimate production. In all
but four of the 27 sectors, the coe±cient on the lagged ·f level is lower (either
more negative or less positive) than the coe±cient on recent-year investment.
So, older vintages of foreign equipment seem to hamper productivity, whereas
¯rms' more recent investments in foreign equipment tend to a®ect productivity
positively or at least not as strongly negatively. In other words, ¯rms seem to
learn to implement foreign equipment more e®ectively over time.
Firms may bene¯t from embodied technology when acquiring foreign goods.
That is, foreign drilling machines or turning lathes are supposed to do more
than just process a workpiece. They are thought to be essentially di®erent from
their domestic counterparts under this hypothesis. If it is true, foreign inputs
25should enter the production function separately and interact with other factors
in a di®erent way than domestic inputs. However, foreign inputs are often zero.
In fact, 80.4 percent of all ¯rms in 1986-1995 dispose of no foreign machines,
and 56.9 percent of all ¯rms in 1996-1998 use no foreign intermediate inputs.
So, standard production functions cannot be estimated. To accumulate more
evidence, earlier drafts of this paper used a Box-Cox transformation for both
types of foreign inputs in addition to the modi¯ed Cobb-Douglas production
function and estimated production functions under accordingly adjusted Olley-
Pakes procedures.
Under a Box-Cox transformation, resulting log TFP ¯gures were lower and
behaved more erratically, while estimates of input e±ciency di®erentials were
higher. Under the extreme counterfactual hypothesis that all inputs had to be
Brazilian rather than partly foreign, I reassessed ¯rm-level TFP_ In the case of
foreign equipment, for instance, I took the di®erence [^ ¯Kf((K
f
i;t)
^ ¸K ¡ 1)=^ ¸K +
^ ¯Kd lnKd
i;t] ¡ [^ ¯Kd ln(Kd
i;t + K
f
i;t)] as a measure for the contribution of foreign
equipment e±ciency and compared it to the values in columns 2, 4 and 6 of ta-
ble 7. The number re°ected the di®erence that setting ·f to zero would make
(the most extreme counterfactual possible). However, the relative magnitude
of foreign input e±ciency was still not high enough to account for substan-
tive TFP changes over time. This vindicates current ¯ndings and there is
little evidence that e®ects of embodied technology are sources of immediate
productivity change.
At the micro-level, to my knowledge only Feenstra et al. (1992) and Fer-
nandes (2003) estimate the e®ect of inputs on production. Feenstra et al.
(1992) distinguish the e®ect of more inputs of the same type from the e®ect
of a greater range of them in a sample of Korean chaebol|albeit not with re-
spect to foreign trade. They detect a positive correlation between their input
measure and the change in TFP. Using a large sample of Colombian plants,
Fernandes (2003) ¯nds that productivity gains are stronger in sectors that use
foreign intermediates to a higher degree. However, neither one of the stud-
ies reports how much TFP change their estimates predict and their ¯ndings
cannot be compared to those of table 7. Keller (2000) reports for a sample of
industries in 8 OECD countries that machinery imports matter but that their
impact may be limited conditional on the e®ect of domestic technology.
Had ¯rms not been able to install foreign equipment or to use foreign
intermediates as after trade liberalization, productivity would have evolved
largely in the same way. Higher quality or e±ciency of foreign inputs likely
elevates their price. Moreover, to make appropriate use of new inputs, ¯rms
need to embed foreign equipment into the production process and may have
to adopt new processes. If they can take such measures only over time, foreign




exporter non-exporter suspended extinct Total
¾i;t
¾i;t+1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
active
exporter 86.2 . 88.4 12.4 . 8.3 .8 . .9 .6 . 2.4 100.0
non-exp. 3.7 . 6.9 91.9 . 86.1 1.6 . 2.0 2.8 . 5.0 100.0
suspended 1.9 . 7.6 31.6 . 31.4 57.3 . 42.0 9.2 . 19.0 100.0
extinct .0 . .0 .0 . .0 .0 . .0 100.0 . 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations from observed transitions 1989-98. (Observations of mergers,
acquisitions and split-ups treated as missing. Transitions 1990-92 treated as if 1990-91.)
Data: Pesquisa Industrial Anual. Firm-level exports from SECEX, 1989-1998.
inputs may not create value beyond cost in the short term.
4.3 Channel 3: Competitive Elimination
What would industry turnover have looked like in the absence of trade liberal-
ization? There are many aspects to industry turnover and it has proven hard
to link them directly to the trade regime. I propose a new method to evaluate
turnover directly: The estimation of Markov probabilities for an active ¯rm's
transition between possible states (modes) of operation.7
The transition probabilities in table 8 re°ect the likely pattern of a Brazilian
manufacturer's choice of operation mode between 1989 and 1991 (to the left of
the arrows), and between 1991 and 1998 (to the right of the arrows). Data on
the exporting status of ¯rms are not available before 1989. There are salient
changes in the unconditional turnover probabilities before and after 1991|the
mid year of Brazil's trade liberalization. The exit probability of a non-exporter,
for instance, rises from 2.8 to ¯ve percent.
To evaluate directly how the trade regime in°uences turnover, transition
probabilities are estimated as functions of the market environment and ¯rm
characteristics, among them productivity. Unnested, unconditional and un-
ordered multinomial logit (MNL) appears to be an appropriate estimation
technique. MNL rests on the assumptions that (i) independence from irrel-
evant alternatives holds, (ii) neither ¯rms nor the states of operation have
7This estimation principle has been applied to education choice, labor market transitions,
patent renewals, replacement investments, fertility and many other dynamic discrete decision
processes before (Magnac and Thesmar 2002).
27Table 9: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Transition Probabilities
¾i;t Exporter Non-Exporter
¾i;t+1 Non-Exp. Susp. Exit Exp. Susp. Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nominal tari®a 1.957 -1.015 -2.680 -.234 -1.300 -1.732
(.303) (1.176) (.944) (.152) (.555) (.482)
Market penetration .270 -1.536 -.540 3.334 -.788 2.317
(.672) (2.156) (1.257) (.507) (1.553) (1.003)
Real exch. rate (usd)b -.781 .434 -2.751 -1.582 -.614 -2.523
(.272) (.831) (.696) (.133) (.467) (.387)
lnTFP-EOP -.081 -.232 .100 .122 -.328 -.258
(.038) (.1) (.068) (.021) (.072) (.057)
·f -1.156 -.695 -2.171 .992 -1.107 -1.242
(.329) (1.221) (.977) (.236) (1.172) (.839)
¹f -1.726 -.112 -.056 -.011 -2.738 .135
(.519) (1.003) (.648) (.407) (2.445) (.805)
¶(med. Ltot)c -1.236 -.836 -1.69 .861 -.181 -.971
(.456) (1.066) (.703) (.27) (.333) (.206)
¶(big Ltot)c -1.826 -2.035 -1.945 1.532 -.700 -1.402
(.456) (1.082) (.721) (.27) (.379) (.243)
¶(med. cap.)d -1.085 -.112 -1.408 .651 -.322 -.172
(.284) (1.029) (.413) (.185) (.256) (.197)
¶(big cap.)d -1.511 -.047 -1.75 1.416 -.235 -.127
(.29) (1.055) (.436) (.188) (.314) (.24)
Sector demande -.102 .057 -.035 .194 .409 .184
(.086) (.243) (.164) (.053) (.171) (.138)
FDI °owf .049 .512 .384 -.497 .205 -.113
(.093) (.223) (.192) (.072) (.188) (.163)
Cum. FDIf .063 .013 -.22 -.034 -.084 -.143
(.037) (.102) (.075) (.026) (.079) (.054)
Obs. 11,092 22,814
Pseudo R2 .045 .081
^ Â2 383.6 1398.8
Pr(Â2
42 > ^ Â2) .0000 .0000
aNext year's nominal tari®.
bAnnual. Based on IPA-OG and US producer price index.
cMedium: (30 · Ltot
i;t < 300), big: (Ltot
i;t ¸ 300).
dMedium: Ki;t + Si;t in middle tercile of ¯rms in a year, big: in upper tercile.
eSector-wide sales in PIA, augmented by foreign market penetration.
fBillion USD per sector. Cumulated FDI is end-of-year stock of invested foreign capital.
Further regressors: Age and a constant (not reported).
28speci¯c characteristics beyond a set of observable covariates, and (iii) the co-
variates capture pro¯t prospects completely so that there is no inherent order-
ing of the operation modes beyond the information in covariates and no serial
correlation in the error term.8 Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show that dy-
namic choice models are generally underidenti¯ed. Firm-¯xed e®ects or serial
correlation in the error, for instance, can only be estimated at the expense of
other restrictions since optimality conditions cannot provide identi¯cation for
more than one reference ¯rm.
MNL is a natural point of departure. Under the MNL assumptions, a ¯rm's
probabilistic choice is






where the choice set M of operation modes includes four alternatives states
¾i;t+1: to be an exporter, to be a domestically active ¯rm only, to suspend
production temporarily, or to exit. The model is estimated independently for
the three possible current states ¾i;t: exporter, non-exporter, or temporarily
suspended ¯rm.
Table 9 reports results for active ¯rms (¾i;t: exporter or non-exporter),
and table 10 presents the remaining category (¾i;t: suspended ¯rm). Since
probabilities have to sum to unity, the parameter vector ¯¾ is only identi¯ed for
three choices relative to a fourth choice of reference. Here, the current states
of operation (¾i;t+1 = ¾i;t) are chosen as the respective points of reference.
The reference for a non-exporter, for instance, is that the ¯rm remains a non-
exporter.
To ¯nd the e®ect of trade on turnover beyond previous channels, I use ¯rm-
level logTFP-EOP as a regressor of its own. Productivity has the expected
e®ect on turnover. The lower it is, the more likely a ¯rm exits or suspends
production (columns 2, 5 and 6 in table 9). Interestingly, log TFP-EOP does
not signi¯cantly a®ect the exit likelihood of exporters (column 3). Both theory
(Melitz 2003, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum 2003b, Yeaple 2003) and
empirical evidence (Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998, Bernard and Jensen 1999)
suggest that more e±cient ¯rms self-select into becoming exporters. The
present analysis supports this hypothesis. When productivity is high, non-
exporters start exporting more often (column 4) and exporters abandon ex-
porting less frequently (column 1). Table 11 shows that the estimates are
similar for logTFP-OLS. Incentives for exporting from Brazil hardly changed
8Ordered logit has the unattractive feature of summarizing the transition likelihood with
a single scalar score variable. MNL, on the other hand, allows to distinguish di®erent
coe±cients of the covariates for di®erent transitions.
29Table 10: Further Multinomial Logit Estimates of Transition
Probabilities
¾i;t Suspended Firm Non-Exporter
¾i;t+1 Exp. Dom. Exit Exp. Susp. Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nominal tari®a -19.311 -8.135 -3.082 -.258 -1.300 -1.758
(4.416) (3.979) (2.478) (.175) (.556) (.483)
¢ Tari®a -10.132 -1.411 -1.661
(.356) (1.281) (1.333)
Market penetration .003 2.509 -6.478 5.811 -.729 2.842
(7.382) (5.772) (11.352) (.549) (1.663) (1.041)
¢ Mkt. penetration -10.597 7.206 -4.683
(2.262) (7.024) (3.402)
Real exch. rate (usd)b 9.303 5.671 -.192 -2.771 -.618 -2.713
(3.166) (2.736) (3.365) (.153) (.487) (.43)
lnTFP-EOP 1.106 .299 -.801 .113 -.321 -.273
(.392) (.339) (.366) (.023) (.072) (.057)
Obs. 104 22,783
Pseudo R2 .357 .12
^ Â2 2009.5
Pr(Â2
48 > ^ Â2) .0000
aNext year's tari®.
bAnnual. Based on IPA-OG and US producer price index.
Further regressors: ·f, ¹f, ¶(med. Ltot), ¶(big Ltot), ¶(med. cap.), ¶(big cap.), sector
demand, FDI °ow, cumulated FDI, and a constant.
over the period. So, the positive association of higher productivity with ex-
porting status can be regarded as close to causal: High productivity turns
¯rms into exporters.
Findings for both tari®s and the real exchange rate show that reduced
barriers to imports bring about more exits. Firms choose next period's state
of operation with regard to market prospects (exit in the data means exit in
the following year). So, tari®s here are next year's tari®s. The lower the tari®,
the more likely it is that a ¯rm goes out of business (columns 3 and 6). The
estimate of -1.73 in column 6 means that a reduction of tari®s by 10 percentage
points (.1) raises the exit probability by 1.2 (= e:173) percent relative to a non-
exporter's likelihood of remaining a non-exporter. Similarly, lower tari®s make
it more likely that a ¯rm suspends production (column 5), possibly to wait for
a return to higher tari® protection.
30Table 11: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Transition Probabilities
¾i;t Exporter Non-Exporter
lnTFP-OLS ¾i;t+1 Non-Exp. Susp. Exit Exp. Susp. Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nominal tari®a 2.072 -.393 -2.676 -.625 -1.023 -1.653
(.304) (1.135) (.985) (.153) (.573) (.503)
Market penetration .218 -1.586 -.723 3.657 -.992 2.466
(.658) (1.946) (1.226) (.53) (1.508) (.986)
Real exch. rate (usd)b -.761 .552 -2.759 -1.558 -.702 -2.628
(.272) (.811) (.688) (.132) (.471) (.392)
lnTFP-OLS -.123 -.509 .007 .346 -.357 -.142
(.052) (.154) (.112) (.028) (.092) (.068)
Obs. 11,092 22,814
Pseudo R2 .046 .086
^ Â2 398.8 1470.5
Pr(Â2
42 > ^ Â2) .0000 .0000
aNext year's tari®.
bAnnual. Based on IPA-OG and US producer price index.
Further regressors: Age, ·f, ¹f, ¶(med. Ltot), ¶(big Ltot), ¶(med. cap.), ¶(big cap.),
sector demand, FDI °ow, cumulated FDI, and a constant (not reported).
A low (appreciated) real exchange rate has a similarly strong e®ect on
exit (columns 3 and 6) but no signi¯cant e®ect on the suspension decision
(columns 2 and 5). Since ¯rms are likely not able to predict the real exchange
rate, current levels are used in the regression. The lower the real exchange
rate, the harder it is to compete abroad, and more Brazilian exporters stop
exporting (column 1). Surprisingly, a low real exchange rate induces non-
exporting ¯rms to start exporting (column 4). The result could possibly imply
that exporters bene¯t from observing the in°ux of foreign goods to identify
internationally competitive product characteristics.
In the previous MNL regressions, the government's choice of tari® levels,
the real exchange rate and foreign competitors' market penetration are taken
as exogenous to Brazilian ¯rms' transition choices. However, the Brazilian
government aimed to induce a Competitive Push. Similarly, foreign competi-
tors care about the prevailing e±ciency level in Brazil. Since productivity and
not turnover was targeted, the inclusion of log TFP as a covariate should mit-
igate endogeneity concerns. To check the estimates, both changes and levels
of potentially endogenous variables can be included in the MNL regressions.
Table 10 (columns 4 through 6) shows the results for non-exporters. While the
31coe±cient on market penetration changes to a certain degree, the estimate of
the nominal tari® coe±cient is stable across speci¯cations.
In the absence of trade liberalization, industry turnover would have ex-
hibited signi¯cantly less exits. A di®erence-in-di®erence analysis shows that
exiting ¯rms have 8.2 percent lower productivity than survivors on average. So,
exits may help raise average productivity. However, the shutdown probability
ranges between two and ¯ve percent only. The bearing of exits on aggregate
productivity remains to be evaluated. A counterfactual simulation follows in
section 5.
4.4 Possible additional e®ects
Entry is another aspect of turnover. Fiercer foreign competition can deter
entry|a Competitive Elimination of business projects before they are realized.
However, the present analysis excludes entry for two reasons. For one, entry
was not always recorded systematically in PIA. Second, the counterfactual is
hard to answer in general: How many more business proposals would have been
pulled out from the drawers had trade not been reformed? It is likely that only
the most productive projects will be realized after trade reform. Then the net
e®ect on e±ciency is ambiguous. Less but more productive entrants can move
aggregate productivity either way.
At least from a theoretical perspective, there are two additional channels
through which trade may a®ect productivity. In the aggregate of sectors, a
fourth channel can be Competitive Reallocation. Less competitive ¯rms lose
market share, while more competitive ¯rms grow in relative size. Models with
Cournot or monopolistic competition predict this. In well-functioning factor
markets, a reallocation of capital and labor to the more e±cient ¯rms should
take place. The e®ect raises sector-wide productivity because averages are
size-weighted. It is di±cult, however, to relate size change directly to trade
liberalization. In fact, it is likely to be an indirect e®ect in several ways.
First, trade encourages ¯rms to raise individual productivity through a
Competitive Push and a Foreign Input Push. Firms that are faster at adopt-
ing higher productivity grow in relative size. Therefore, size change gives the
Competitive Push (1) and the Foreign Input Push (2) an extra boost. Simi-
larly, after suspension or exit has occurred due to Competitive Elimination (3),
the surviving ¯rms grow in size and the ¯ttest grow relatively faster. In this
way, size change also reinforces channel 3 e®ects. Finally, increased foreign
competition squeezes the market share of domestic Brazilian ¯rms. Again,
the less productive ones are likely squeezed more strongly which boosts ef-
fects from channels 1 and 2 further. On all of these accounts, size change
32should not necessarily be considered its own channel but rather an augment
to previous channels. Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2002) show for US
telecom suppliers and Chilean manufacturers that more e±cient plants grow
faster, whereas Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2003a) and Muendler, Serv¶ en
and Sep¶ ulveda (2001) cannot con¯rm this for US manufacturing plants and
Brazilian manufacturing ¯rms, respectively.
However, size change does seem to be a channel of its own with regard
to economies of scale. If economies of scale exist, ¯rms that face import
competition may su®er from lower scales of production after being squeezed,
while exit of their domestic competitors helps them realize previously un-
exploited economies of scale. So, con°icting forces are at work and it is
not clear which would prevail. Studies that investigate scale e®ects from
trade are, in general, not able to con¯rm an e®ect empirically (Tybout and
Westbrook 1995, Roberts and Tybout, eds 1996). Unfortunately, productivity
and economies of scale are not identi¯ed simultaneously when price is endoge-
nous (Klette and Griliches 1996). So, this channel cannot be evaluated in the
present context.
In the industry aggregate, a ¯fth channel of trade-related productivity ef-
fects is Induced Specialization. Due to Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin type forces
of trade, a country's industry may specialize in sectors where the innovative
potential is largely exhausted. Similarly, the erosion of rents for domestic
producers may sti°e product innovation. This can lower average productivity
change and partly o®set present channels. Theoretical contributions in favor of
the hypothesis include Young (1991) and Xie (1999). This ¯fth channel cannot
be evaluated in the current context with incomplete sector data. Using cross-
country data, Weinhold and Rauch (1999) ¯nd empirical evidence against the
hypothesis.
Finally, while ¯rm heterogeneity as analyzed here dispenses with some as-
sumptions behind classic trade theory, another important assertion deserves
further scrutiny: The induced reallocation of workers and capital goods be-
tween ¯rms and across sectors need not work perfectly. Possible costs have
to be set against the gains from prior channels. Wacziarg and Wallack (forth-
coming) use cross-country data for 25 periods of trade liberalization and argue
that trade liberalization has far smaller e®ects on labor reallocation across sec-
tors than is often presumed. However, preliminary analysis for Brazil shows
substantial layo®s and calls for further research.
33Table 12: Counterfactual Simulations
log TFP
Counterfactual 1986 1990 1992 1995 1998
EOP
De facto 1 .9813 .9958 1.0001 1.0281
Ch. 1 o® Tari®s unchangeda 1 .9774 .9857 .9981 1.0291
Ch. 2 o® ·f and ¹f lowerb 1 .9776 .9955 1.0000 1.0271
Ch. 3 o® Tari®s unchangedc 1 .9813 .9957 1.0001 1.0279
OLS
De facto 1 .9721 .9835 .9845 1.0130
Ch. 1 o® Tari®s unchangeda 1 .9673 .9713 .9818 1.0141
Ch. 2 o® ·f and ¹f lowerb 1 .9656 .9822 .9838 1.0115
Ch. 3 o® Tari®s unchangedc 1 .9721 .9834 .9843 1.0126
aTari®s are taken to a®ect TFP change according to the estimate in table 7, column 2.
bBased on separate regression estimates, a 10 percentage point lower tari® is taken to
result in a 2.62 percentage point higher demand for foreign inputs relative to domestic inputs.
This is a very favorable assumption.
cTari®s assumed to a®ect exit according to estimates in table 9, columns 3 and 6. In the
counterfactual sample, an according share of exiting ¯rms is randomly kept (with produc-
tivity at the level of their de facto exit).
5 Counterfactual simulations
To assess the relative importance of the three channels, one can switch them o®
individually and simulate log TFP in their absence. The ¯rst row in table 12
shows how productivity evolves in the sample for both the log TFP-EOP and
the logTFP-OLS measures. Trade reform took e®ect in 1990, whereas previous
tari® reductions did most likely not matter for productivity change because
non-tari® barriers remained binding. To base the following simulations on a
parsimonious set of assumptions, non-tari® barriers and indirect productivity
e®ects from import demand are discarded. Only the direct e®ect of tari®s on
productivity is considered.
To assess the Competitive Push (1), I reduce each individual ¯rm's observed
TFP by ^ ¢lnTFPi;t = ¡:611(¿t ¡¿t¡1) year over year between 1990 and 1998
(but not cumulatively). The coe±cient estimate ¡:611 for tari® levels is taken
from table 3, column 2. Now, ¿t denotes nominal tari®s for products in that
¯rm's sector. By 1992, TFP-EOP would have been one percent lower had
there not been an increase in foreign competition. Since tari®s were raised
again after 1995, however, about .1 percent less TFP-EOP is observed in 1998
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Data: Simulated and de facto productivity in PIA.
Figure 4: Log TFP under three scenarios
than would have been feasible had tari®s remained at their low.
For the Foreign Input Push (2), one needs to infer what share of foreign in-
puts after trade reform is due to lower tari®s. Firms did buy foreign equipment
before trade liberalization. Lower tari®s will make the equipment cheaper,
however, and boost demand. Simple regressions for the machinery and equip-
ment sector show that market penetration increases by 2.65 percent points
when tari®s are lowered by 10 percentage points (the point estimate in a re-
gression of penetration on tari®s is -.265 for equipment). This response is
magnitudes stronger than the average across all sectors (of only 0.02 percent-
age points, coe±cient -.0016). The machinery estimate is likely upward biased
because tari®s also catch the e®ect of changing non-tari® barriers. The esti-
mate is still used both for equipment and foreign intermediates to provide a
favorable upper bound in the simulation. Even then, the simulated impact of
foreign factors on productivity is small.
The counterfactual share of foreign equipment (between 1990 and 1995) is




i;t + :265 ¢ (¿t ¡ ¿1988), where ¿t denotes nominal tari®s
on investment goods in year t (measured on a scale from 0 to 1). This is a
further favorable assumption for channel 2 since shares of foreign equipment
in installed capital would not respond as fast as acquisitions. I apply a sim-
ilar calculation to foreign intermediates (1996 through 1998). Here the 2.65
percent-point response of market penetration to a 10 percent tari® reduction
is overly favorable. Even under such favorable assumptions, the simulation
35results in table 12 vindicate that this channel is not important. Except for a
detectable immediate e®ect in 1990, productivity would have evolved largely
in the same way had less foreign inputs been used.
Similar simulations for foreign intermediate goods would yield a more no-
ticeable impact for the period 1996-98. However, this simulation is plagued
with substantial measurement error. In fact, in only one of 27 sectors the
coe±cient estimate on foreign intermediate goods is signi¯cant under EOP es-
timation. At a signi¯cance level of .95, 20 tests likely yield signi¯cance in one
case by mere chance. The simulated value for 1998 should therefore be taken
very cautiously.
For Competitive Elimination (3), I simulate exit among exporters and non-
exporters. Given the standardization chosen in the MNL model of section 4.3,
the expected share of exits in year t is E[nexit;t+1=Nactive;tj¿t] = exp[^ ¯¿(¿t ¡
¿1988)]¢P(¿1988) where ^ ¯¿ is the coe±cient estimate for tari®s (table 9, columns 3
and 6). Expected exit would be ^ E[^ nexit;t+1=Nactive;tj¿1988] ´ P(¿1988) at 1988
tari®s. So, one can consider 1 ¡ exp[¡^ ¯¿(¿t ¡ ¿1990)] an estimate for the rel-
ative share of exits (nexit;t+1 ¡ ^ nexit;t+1)=nexit;t+1 that is attributable to tari®
reductions. To assess the counterfactual of frozen tari®s at the 1988 level, I
had a share 1¡exp[¡^ ¯¿(¿t¡¿1988)] randomly drawn from the observed exiting
¯rms and put back into the sample, duplicating their year t observation for
t + 1 and beyond.
The reported EOP (OLS) simulation randomly added 281 (350) observa-
tions of otherwise exiting ¯rms to the total sample of 42,024 (42,093) valid ob-
servations. There is no immediate productivity e®ect from exits in 1990. This
may mean that trade reform induced both high and low productivity ¯rms to
exit initially. Anecdotal evidence for the equipment sector, for instance, con-
¯rms this. Relatively advanced ¯rms chose to exit in the early nineties since
their products could often not compete with foreign goods, while domestic
¯rms with products in low-quality and low-productivity niches were favored.
By 1998, there is a small but detectable e®ect. Since this channel unfolds its
impact over time and no favorable assumptions go into the simulations (as op-
posed to channel 2), the simulated outcomes should be interpreted somewhat
more favorably. Had exiting ¯rms stayed, productivity could have been up to
.6 percent lower|about a tenth of the de facto productivity change between
1990 and 1998.
Figure 4 depicts simulation results for the Competitive Push and Competi-
tive Elimination. The Competitive Push (1) has a considerable and immediate
impact on productivity. Competitive elimination (3) a®ects too few ¯rms to
have an immediate e®ect but unfolds some impact over time. Qualitative
evidence con¯rms this pattern.
36Amann (1999) studies the Brazilian non-serial capital goods sector and
argues that managers did not ¯nd foreign inputs with embodied technology
a major source for innovation (p. 342). In other words, they did not expect
much of a Foreign Input Push (2). Amann (1999, p. 351) also states that
managers restructured processes after 1989 but engaged in little e®orts of their
own to innovate products. This supports the importance of the Competitive
Push (1). However some managers chose to obtain foreign designs to improve
their products (Amann 1999, p. 342). That is a possibly important channel of
knowledge °ows unrelated to the °ow of traded goods.
On all those accounts, only the Competitive Push seems to drive a salient
part of productivity change, while neither the Foreign Input Push nor Compet-
itive Elimination can exert a noticeable impact over the horizon of a decade.
6 Conclusion
Brazil's trade liberalization in the early 1990s presents a focused policy exper-
iment to trace e®ects of trade on productivity change. The federal government
slashed inward trade barriers to less than a quarter of their initial levels within
three years but left outward trade barriers largely untouched. A sample of
9,500 medium-sized to large Brazilian manufacturers is followed over the pe-
riod from 1986 until 1998. For the ¯rst time, three channels of trade-induced
productivity change can be distinguished in this data set: (1) Foreign import
competition in product markets exerts a Competitive Push on individual ¯rms.
Theory predicts that managers may choose to innovate processes and remove
slack under ¯ercer competition. (2) Easier access to foreign equipment and
intermediates may allow for a Foreign Input Push at the ¯rm level. (3) Com-
petition in the product market may also induce more exits and bring about a
Competitive Elimination of ine±cient ¯rms.
Productivity measures from three alternative methods are calculated (an
index with assumed capital-goods intensity of a third, an index from OLS
production function estimates, and an index from an extended Olley and Pakes
1996 algorithm). The measures yield similar results.
Trade liberalization induces competitive pressure. It unleashes a Compet-
itive Push on ¯rms to raise their e±ciency (channel 1). This proves to be a
noticeable source of productivity change. Controlling for the endogeneity of
foreign market penetration and tari®s through instrumental variables (compo-
nents of sector-speci¯c real exchange rates), small changes in the tari® act are
shown to induce considerable e±ciency improvements among surviving ¯rms.
However, the Foreign Input Push (channel 2) is found to be relatively unimpor-
tant. The e±ciency di®erence between foreign and domestic inputs has only a
37minor bearing on productivity. Foreign technology adoption likely takes time
due to learning e®ects, factor complementarities and necessary production re-
arrangements. When trade barriers fall, the Competitive Elimination of the
least e±cient ¯rms (channel 3) strikes more ¯ercely. Estimates of turnover
probabilities in multinomial logit regressions con¯rm that both the likelihood
of survival drops markedly when trade barriers fall and that low-e±ciency
¯rms go out of business more frequently. Counterfactual simulations indicate,
however, that Competitive Elimination only slowly unfolds a modest impact
on aggregate productivity. It stems from just a small share of ¯rms.
Simulations underscore the force of the Competitive Push. This channel
is a remarkable source of productivity change among Brazilian manufacturers
between 1990 and 1998.
Beyond these three direct channels, several further and mostly indirect ef-
fects of trade on the production sector deserve attention. Productivity changes
among survivors and exits of the least e±cient ¯rms induce competitive reallo-
cations. More e±cient ¯rms typically gain market share so that size change is
as an augment to the three direct channels analyzed here. Trade may induce
less developed economies to specialize in low-growth sectors. Similarly, trade
may sti°e innovation as rents erode with foreign competition. Finally, the
e®ectiveness and costliness of the induced factor reallocation deserves closer
scrutiny. In the latter cases, potential costs need to be set against the gains to
the production sector. Since the gains are found to be small despite Brazil's
substantial trade reform and despite the neglect of costs, the largest bene¯ts
from trade may indeed be those to consumers, as classic trade theory posits,
and not those from induced changes to the production technology.
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A Firm-level Data Construction
The Brazilian statistical bureau (IBGE) conducts an annual survey of mining and
manufacturing ¯rms, called Pesquisa Industrial Anual (PIA). It comprises a sample
of formally established, medium-sized to large Brazilian ¯rms for the years 1986 to
1990, 1992 to 1995, and 1996 to the present. This paper considers only the period
1986 through 1998 and disregards the mining sectors. Muendler (2003) documents
in detail the construction of an unbalanced panel data set from PIA|including the
establishment of longitudinal relations between ¯rms (such as entry, creation, exit,
and mergers or acquisitions), consistency adjustments for economic variables due to
questionnaire changes, price de°ation of the economic variables, and the derivation
of consistent capital stock series. This paper considers the subperiod 1986 through
1998. The present appendix merely summarizes data characteristics.
A ¯rm quali¯es for PIA if at least half of its revenues stem from manufacturing
activity and if it is formally registered with the Brazilian tax authorities. In 1986,
the initial PIA sample was built on three layers: (1) A non-random sample of the
largest Brazilian manufacturers with output corresponding to at least 200 million
Reais in 1995 (around 200 million US dollars in 1995). There were roughly 800 of
them. (2) A random sample among medium-sized ¯rms whose annual output in
1985 exceeded a value corresponding to R$ 100,000 in 1995 (around USD 100,000
in 1995). More than 6,900 ¯rms made it into PIA this way. (3) A non-random
selection of newly founded ¯rms. PIA only included new ¯rms that surpassed an
annual average employment level of at least 100 persons. The inclusion process ended
in 1993, however. Until then, around 1,800 ¯rms were identi¯ed in this manner.
A ¯rm that entered PIA through one of the selection criteria for medium-sized
to large manufacturers in 1986 remains in the sample until it is legally extinct.
Moreover, if a ¯rm in PIA reports the creation of a new ¯rm as a subsidiary, a±liate,
related ¯rm or spin-o®, this new ¯rm enters PIA too. No sample was taken in 1991
due to a federal austerity program. The sampling method changed in 1996, and no
capital stock ¯gures are reported since. Therefore, the data set of this paper only
embraces ¯rms after 1995 that were present in PIA earlier or that were longitudinally
related to an earlier ¯rm. Their capital stock is inferred with a perpetual inventory
method. Following the change in sampling, there is a drop in the sample in 1996.
Tests at various stages of production estimation prove it exogenous.
Economic variables in PIA include sales ¯gures and changes in ¯nal goods stocks,
costs of inputs, salaries, employment of blue- and white-collar workers, and several
variables related to investment and the capital stock. Most interestingly, ¯rms in
PIA report their acquisitions of foreign equipment until 1995 and their purchases of
foreign intermediate goods since 1996.
Domestic data are de°ated with three di®erent price indices to check for sensi-
39tivity. The sector-speci¯c wholesale price index IPA-OG underlies all results in this
paper. Another sector-speci¯c wholesale price index, IPA-DI (excluding imports),
and the economy-wide price index IGP-DI (a combined wholesale and consumer
price index) do not yield substantially di®erent results. There is no producer price
index for Brazil. Output and domestic inputs are de°ated with sector-speci¯c price
indices (constructed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices and input-
output matrices). Capital stock ¯gures and investments are de°ated with economy-
wide price indices (constructed on the basis of Brazilian wholesale price indices and
economy-wide capital formation vectors).
Foreign equipment acquisitions and foreign intermediate inputs are de°ated in
two steps. First, sector-speci¯c series of import-weighted foreign producer prices,
adjusted for nominal exchange rate °uctuations relative to the US-Dollar, are ap-
plied. Then, (investment-weighted) nominal tari®s on foreign machinery and (sector-
speci¯c input-weighted) nominal tari®s on intermediates are removed from equip-
ment acquisitions and intermediate inputs. This procedure resolves an otherwise
possible tari®-induced correlation between foreign input values and the productivity
index in the error term of the production function.
The overall capital stock is inferred under a perpetual inventory method that
controls for changes to accounting law in 1991. Both investments and book values
of capital goods are reported in PIA until 1995. Investments are assumed to become
productive parts of the capital stock within the year of their reporting. They are used
to infer typical depreciation rates through regression analysis. Foreign equipment
levels are inferred from foreign equipment acquisitions and overall retirements. The
structures part in total capital includes rented capital goods. These stocks of rented
capital goods are inferred from reported rental rates, which are taken to equal the
(time-varying) user cost of capital. Consistency adjustments are made under the
perpetual inventory method when stock changes are observed that di®er from net
investments (di®erent de°ators can cause this). Usually, simple averages are used.
Since sector-wide depreciation rates are applied, the resulting capital stock series for
1986-1998 are smoother across ¯rms and over time than the raw series.
Sector classi¯cations in PIA would allow for the estimation of production func-
tions at a level that corresponds to three ISIC rev. 3 digits (n¶ ³vel 100). However,
large ¯rms in PIA are likely to o®er product ranges beyond narrowly de¯ned sector
limits. Data at more aggregate levels also provide more variation in the cross sec-
tion because variables related to the market environment become available for two
or more subsectors within several sectors. Those variables provide identi¯cation.
Moreover, switching from the three to the two-digit level increases the number of
observations per estimation considerably. So, estimation is carried out at two ISIC
digits (n¶ ³vel 50).
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